🤯 Why China South City Collapsed Despite Government Backing

How China’s biggest trade city became ghost town #1

Together with

New here? Join us to become the top 1% founder by learning from startup failures:

Hey Founders,

Welcome to The Runway Ventures — a weekly newsletter where I deep dive into failed startup stories to help you become the top 1% founder by learning from their mistakes with actionable insights.

Today’s story is about how a China’s state-backed company collapsed because of these 2 deadly mistakes. Let’s get to it! 🚀

Today at a Glance:

  • ☠️ 1 Failed Startup → China South City

  • ⚠️ 2 Mistakes → Drowning in debt without a safety net

  • 🧠 3 Lessons Learned → Growth on debt is a double-edged sword

  • 🔗 The Runway Insights → How to navigate PoC requests without slowing your sales cycle

  • 💰 Southeast Asia Funding Radar → Prefer raises $4.2M (Pre-Series A) to scale low carbon coffee and cocoa alternatives

    • Fun Fact: I recently invited Jake (co-founder & CEO of Prefer) to my podcast to share his full journey, mistakes, and learnings. Check out his untold story here.

Jake, if you’re reading this, congrats to your latest fundraise! 🎉

If you’re a founder and looking to amplify your startup story (be it your journey, mistakes, and learnings) for branding or finding your next customers and investors, then The Runway Ventures is your distribution channel.

🫡 You’ll get:

  • Podcast where I’ll ask great questions for you to share your startup journey (yes — the raw and untold story)

  • Full deep dive of your story (sent to 15,700+ newsletter subscribers who are mainly founders + investors in Asia).

  • LinkedIn posts to share your story with my ~57k+ followers.

It’s not free, but it’s not expensive either.

I’ve spent ~2 years building a highly curated founder community in Asia. And I can guarantee that you won’t find this niche and engaged founder community anywhere else.

  • The worst case scenario — 73k+ founders + investors in Asia know who you are and what you’re building for future partnerships.

  • The best case scenario — You get new customers and investors.

Either way, it’s a win for you. So if you’re keen, book a call here and I’ll see if it’s a good fit.

PS - You must have a good story to tell and be open to sharing your mistakes and learnings.

☠️ 1 Failed Startup: China South City

🚀 The Rise of China South City

🇨🇳 Founded by a group of 5 seasoned entrepreneurs in 2002, China South City created massive integrated logistics and trade centers that would revolutionise how China did business with the world.

  • The Problem — 📦 China was becoming the world's factory, but the logistics infrastructure was fragmented and inefficient.

    • Suppliers of things like textiles, electronics components, plastics, paper packaging, and metals were scattered all over the place.

    • Manufacturers and distributors struggled with sourcing materials as they had to hop between different markets, deal with inconsistent services and inefficient logistics.

  • The Solution — 🏭 China South City built massive, integrated logistics and trade complexes — centralising multiple industries, providing warehousing, trade, and exhibition services all in one location with a scalable model.

    • They called this “One‑Body‑with‑Two‑Wings” model.

      • One Body — Large integrated logistics and trade centers

      • Two Wings — Commercial ancillary and residential services

    • This model streamlined sourcing, improved efficiency, and revamped how industrial materials were traded and distributed in China.

🌏 In short, with its “One‑Body‑with‑Two‑Wings” model, China South City wanted to transform old-school wholesale markets into efficient, modern trade hubs.

China South City Shenzhen

They didn't just build warehouses - they created entire ecosystems.

Their first project, China South City Shenzhen, strategically located in the Pearl River Delta, commenced operations in December 2004.

🚀 This concept really took off.

🤝🏻 Suppliers loved having a ready marketplace, and buyers loved the convenience of finding everything in one place.

China South City’s stock performance on TradingView

At its peak, China South City went public on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in September 2009, raising HK$2.916 billion. The Hong Kong public offering was over-subscribed 33 times — that's insane demand.

🇨🇳 Thanks to the success in Shenzhen and fundraising from IPO, China South City replicated the model across China, setting up giant logistics and wholesale complexes in places like Nanning, Xi’an, Nanchang, Zhengzhou, Harbin, Hefei, and more.

  • Manufacturers and distributors were flocking to these centers.

  • The company made money by selling and leasing space, while also offering services like warehousing, logistics, and even running outlet malls and trade exhibitions on-site.

  • Business was booming at that time.

🔥 The ultimate validation came when Tencent invested HK$1.5 billion for a 9.9% stake. This wasn't just money — it was a strategic partnership with one of China's biggest tech companies to integrate online and offline commerce.

📈📈📈 After the Tencent deal was announced, China South City’s stock price skyrocketed to an all-time high at HK$4.72 in 2014.

That’s it.

A proven business model, a successful IPO behind it, big-name investors (with state backing), rapid expansion, and a grand vision to modernise China’s industrial supply chain…

🏔️ China South City had made it to the top.

📉 The Fall of China South City

Sadly, things started to go wrong in the years that followed.

🏦 After years of over-expansion and borrowing to build massive trade hubs, the company was crushed by China’s property downturn.

Even state-backed bailouts couldn’t stop the bleeding, as defaults piled up and cash reserves ran dry. By August 2025, a Hong Kong court ordered its liquidation, making it the first state-backed developer to collapse in China’s real estate crisis.

📌 Here’s what happened to China South City:

📈📈📈 From trade centers to IPO

  • Aug 2002 — 🏭 China South City was founded in Hong Kong by Cheng Chung Hing, Leung Moon Lam, Ma Kai Cheung, Sun Kai Lit (Cliff Sun), and Ma Wai Mo., with a vision to build large-scale industrial trade centers in China.

  • 30 Sep 2009Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, raising capital to expand its logistics and trade center projects.

  • Jan 2014 — 💰 Tencent Holdings invested HK$1.5 billion for a 9.9% stake in China South City, forming a strategic partnership to integrate online services and boost e-commerce logistics.

    • Around this time, China South City operated 7 major trade centers across China and business is at its peak.

    • China South City’s share price hit a record high of HK$4.73 amid optimism from the Tencent deal and nationwide expansion (this would mark its stock’s all-time peak).

  • Dec 2021🥵 This was the period when giants like Evergrande started defaulting, and a multi-year debt crisis gripped China’s real estate developers.

    • 💰 Shenzhen SEZ Construction Group (state-owned) injected HK$1.9 billion for a 29.3% stake, becoming the largest shareholder and providing a bailout to help China South City repay debts.

    • For a while, it looked like China South City might dodge disaster thanks to government support.

💸 Too much debt → loan defaults

  • Feb 2024🚨 China South City defaulted on its US dollar bond, signalling severe financial distress and prompting the company to pursue an offshore debt restructuring plan.

    • The bailout couldn’t save China South City due to its heavy debt.

    • By the end of 2024, China South City’s total liabilities had swelled to about HK$60.9 billion (roughly $7.7 billion).

    • In fact, a huge chunk of that debt was coming due very soon, while the company’s cash reserves had dwindled to virtually nothing (only about HK$40 million in cash by late 2024).

    • Essentially, they were running on fumes.

  • Jan 2025 — ☠️ With no successful restructuring in place, Citibank (as bond trustee) filed a winding-up petition in the Hong Kong High Court to liquidate China South City and recover $1.4 billion for creditors.

  • 11 Aug 2025 — 👨🏻‍⚖️ The Hong Kong High Court issued a liquidation order for China South City, ordering the company to be wound up.

    • Trading of its shares was suspended, and liquidators took control of the firm’s assets.

    • Unfortunately, China South City becomes the first state-backed Chinese developer to collapse in the 2021–2025 property debt crisis.

🙏🏻 In short, China South City’s collapse was caused by over-expansion, heavy debt, and an unforgiving market downturn.

The company grew fast and borrowed big, assuming that trade center sales and rentals would keep generating cash. But when the property cycle turned and China’s economy slowed, they couldn’t sell units fast enough or high enough to cover their debt payments.

The saddest part? China South City's original vision was actually brilliant and ahead of its time.

In a different economic environment, they might have become one of China's greatest success stories. Instead, they became a cautionary tale about the perils of timing, leverage, and the limits of government support in a capitalist market.

Want to learn more about China South City’s downfall?

⚠️ 2 Mistakes

Mistake 1: Drowning in debt without a safety net

China South City’s entire model was capital-intensive: buy land, build enormous trade complexes, and only later generate cash by selling or leasing space. That meant heavy upfront spending with long payback cycles.

🤑 Instead of pacing growth with internally generated revenue, they leaned heavily on debt financing:

  • Bonds

  • Bank loans

  • Short-term borrowing

🦄 At its peak, the company’s liabilities hit HK$60.9 billion (~US$7.7B), but by the end of 2024, they had only HK$40 million (~US$5M) in cash left. That’s like trying to run a unicorn startup with $1,000 in your bank account while owing $200,000 to the bank. When the property market cooled and unit sales slowed, they simply didn’t have enough cash to service interest payments.

Even state help couldn’t save them. In 2021, Shenzhen’s state-owned group injected HK$1.9B to pay off some debts, but it barely scratched the surface.

Defaults started piling up in 2024, and once bondholders lost trust, the spiral was unstoppable.

Mistake 2: Scaled too fast

China South City nailed its first mega trade hub in Shenzhen. It worked because Shenzhen was already a manufacturing powerhouse with strong demand from textile, electronics, and industrial suppliers.

🏭🏭🏭 But instead of doubling down and optimising there, they went on an expansion blitz, building seven trade hubs across China — in Nanning, Xi’an, Nanchang, Zhengzhou, Harbin, Hefei, and beyond.

Here’s the catch: not every city had Shenzhen-level demand.

  • Some of these hubs were built in regions with less industrial activity.

  • Many tenants didn’t show up in droves as expected.

  • Occupancy rates in smaller cities lagged, and China South City had to offer heavy discounts and incentives just to fill space.

📈 In short, they scaled ahead of demand, assuming “build it and they will come”. But unlike e-commerce or SaaS, where marginal expansion costs are low, here every mistake meant billions locked in concrete.

🧠 3 Lessons Learned

Lesson 1: Growth on debt is a double-edged sword

Debt amplifies both growth and failure. 

If revenue keeps pace, you look brilliant. If it slows, you’re trapped.

🌮 Key Takeaways:
  • 💰 Match capital to your model

    • If you’re building something long-term (deeptech, biotech, infra), lean on patient equity capital (VCs, strategic investors, or government grants) instead of short-term debt.

    • Reserve debt for businesses with steady cash flows.

    • For example, let’s say you’re building a SaaS business, and if you take venture debt, make sure ARR growth is predictable enough to cover repayments. Otherwise, it can backfire.

  • 🔥 Stress-test your worst case

    • Ask: “If my revenue drops 40% for 12 months, can I still service my debt?” 

    • If the answer is no, you’re scaling on thin ice.

    • Always build a liquidity buffer of 12–18 months runway.

  • 🏄🏻‍♂️ Mix fuel types

    • Use debt for short-term, high-confidence bets (i.e. financing inventory you know will sell in 90 days).

    • Use equity for risky, long-term bets (i.e. new market expansion).

Lesson 2: Validate demand before you scale

China South City scaled as if demand was guaranteed nationwide. But instead of validating if suppliers needed such a hub in each city, they just assumed growth would follow supply.

Spoiler: it didn’t.

🌮 Key Takeaways:
  • 🧪 Run pilots first

    • Before opening 7 hubs, test one “mini hub” in a smaller city. In SaaS terms, roll out to a limited geography or customer segment, and track adoption before blitzscaling.

    • Example: If you’re launching a food delivery startup, test one district before covering the whole city.

    • The bottom line? Always start with the smallest problem, the smallest market, the smallest niche that you can find — before expanding to serve wider segments.

  • 🥵 Track pull, not push

    • Expansion should be driven by customer pull (inbound demand, waitlists, repeat users), not just founder vision.

    • Ask: “Are customers begging for this in new markets?”

    • If not, hold.

  • 📊 Use metrics to gate expansion

    • China South City should’ve used occupancy rates as a go/no-go signal.

      • For SaaS, that’s retention.

      • For D2C, that’s repeat purchase rate.

      • For marketplaces, GMV per active user.

    • Don’t launch Market B until Market A shows strong, sustainable metrics.

Lesson 3: Be ruthless about business model resilience

China South City’s business model wasn’t resilient enough to handle shocks — and once the market moved, it broke.

How?

⚠️ At first glance, China South City’s model looked brilliant — build massive physical hubs, sell/lease units, and add logistics and exhibition services. But here’s the weakness — it was a fragile business model:

  • Heavy Capital Dependence: Required billions in upfront construction.

  • Low Agility: Once you’ve built a mega trade center, you can’t pivot quickly if demand falls.

  • Revenue Cyclicality: Depended on property sales and leases, which are highly sensitive to market cycles.

  • External Shocks: Vulnerable to both macro shifts (China’s property downturn) and micro shifts (suppliers moving online).

‼️ By the time e-commerce platforms like Alibaba Wholesale and 1688.com gave suppliers cheaper, digital alternatives, China South City’s model looked outdated.

Instead of reinventing itself aggressively, it tried to bolt on online services (via Tencent partnership) while still dragging the weight of its debt-heavy, capital-intensive model.

🌮 Key Takeaways:
  • 🔥 Stress-test your business model

    • Don’t just build financial models for the best case. Model for worst-case downturns😀 

      • What if sales drop 50%?

      • What if fundraising takes 12 months longer than expected?

      • What if a competitor undercuts you by 30%?

    • Check if revenue is diversified across customers, not overly reliant on one or two big accounts.

  • 💰 Diversify revenue streams

    • Don’t depend on one source (like property sales).

    • Build complementary streams.

      • SaaS → Add upsell modules, usage-based pricing, or customer support tiers.

      • D2C → Mix subscription models with retail partnerships.

      • Marketplaces → Add value-added services (payments, logistics, insurance).

  • 🧐 Stay asset-light where possible

    • Study competitors who survived downturns.

    • Why? Often it’s because their models are asset-light, sticky, or flexible.

      • For example, Alibaba scaled online wholesale with low fixed costs. China South City sank billions into concrete.

    • For founders:

      • Don’t sign 10-year leases for offices or kitchens—start with flexible co-working or shared kitchens.

      • Don’t build hardware from scratch if you can lease or partner.

      • Always look for variable cost models over fixed-heavy commitments.

🔗 The Runway Insights

  • How to navigate PoC requests without slowing your sales cycle (Link)

  • Your playbook to forecasting pipeline at scale (Link)

  • The next phase of B2B content marketing: Influencer Nodes (Link)

  • The new fundraising playbook: Seed-Strapping (Link)

  • How to get millions in revenue with a <15 person team (Link)

  • The State of AI 2025 (Link)

💰 Southeast Asia Funding Radar

  • Prefer raises $4.2M (Pre-Series A) to scale low carbon coffee and cocoa alternatives (Link)

    • Fun Fact: I recently invited Jake (co-founder & CEO of Prefer) to my podcast to share his full journey, mistakes, and learnings. Check it out here.

  • Naluri raises $5M (Series B) to deliver personalised health programs to employees (Link)

  • Graas.ai raises $9M (Pre-Series B) to launch agent foundry for e-commerce automation (Link)

  • Nibertex closes $7M (Series A) to scale sustainable textile production (Link)

🤝🏻 Before you go: Here are 2 ways I can help you

  1. Founder Office Hours: Book a 1-1 call with me, share your problems and questions, and I'll help you cut through the noise, avoid costly mistakes, and get clear next steps that actually work. I help early-stage founders with:

    • Validating ideas & building MVPs

    • Tech & product development

    • GTM strategy & fundraising

    • Finding PMF & growth hacks

    • Growing & monetising newsletters

    • Attract customers & investors by building a solid founder brand on LinkedIn

  2. Promote your business to 18,000+ founders: Acquire high-value leads and customers for your business by getting your brand in front of highly engaged startup founders and operators in Asia.

💃 Rate Today’s Edition

What'd you think of today's edition?

Your feedback helps me create better content for you!

Login or Subscribe to participate in polls.

That’s all for today

Thanks for reading. I hope you enjoyed today's issue. More than that, I hope you’ve learned some actionable tips to build and grow your business.

You can always write to me by simply replying to this newsletter and we can chat.

See you again next week.

- Admond

Disclaimer: The Runway Ventures content is for informational purposes only. Unless otherwise stated, any opinions expressed above belong solely to the author.

Reply

or to participate.