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- 🤯 NocNoc Shut Down After ฿4.39B in 5 Years of Losses
🤯 NocNoc Shut Down After ฿4.39B in 5 Years of Losses
How a home marketplace backed by SCG and ThaiBev lost ฿4.39B on thin commissions and costly heavy-goods delivery.
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Today's story is about NocNoc, the Thai home marketplace backed by SCG and ThaiBev that reached 16.6 million users, lost ฿4.39 billion in 5 years, and was shut by owners who still had cash. Let's get to it! 🚀
Today at a Glance:
☠️ 1 Failed Startup → NocNoc
⚠️ 2 Mistakes → Running a full-stack service business on marketplace commissions
🧠 3 Lessons Learned → Your investors' patience sets your runway
🔗 The Runway Insights → Will agents have network effects?
💰 Southeast Asia Funding Radar → Manus raises $500M+ after China blocked Meta's $2B deal
☠️ 1 Failed Startup: NocNoc
🚀 The Rise of NocNoc
🇹🇭 Founded in 2018 by Chonlak Mahasuvirachai (CEO) and Jeff Booth, NocNoc was a Thai home-and-living e-marketplace — a one-stop shop for buying heavy building materials, booking contractors, and managing home renovations.
🕺🏻🕺🏻 Founders’ Story
Chonlak had spent 25+ years in Thailand's home-building and building-materials industry.
She saw how brutal Thai home renovation was — nobody knew where to start, which tiles to pick, who to trust, or how to explain what they wanted to a contractor.
She and Jeff Booth (ex-BuildDirect) built NocNoc inside BetterBe Marketplace, an SCG company first registered in 2005, as a digital-first home platform.
The Problem — 🥲 Thai home renovation was a nightmare. Fragmented sellers, no price transparency, contractors you couldn't verify, and bulky goods nobody wanted to ship.
Homeowners had to piece everything together alone — design, materials, delivery, installation.
Heavy items like tiles and sanitary ware broke standard e-commerce logistics, so no one touched them.
The Solution — 🏠 NocNoc built a one-stop vertical marketplace just for home & living — products, contractors, heavy delivery, and installation under one roof.
Compare across sellers, order physical samples, book installation, and get warranties.
Added AI recommendations, a loyalty programme, and a B2B service for businesses.
🇹🇭🏠 In short, NocNoc was Thailand's answer to the home renovation chaos — a vertical "IKEA-plus-contractor" marketplace with corporate muscle behind it.
🚪 NocNoc soft-launched in Feb 2019 with a ~US$6 million build budget. By June 2019, it already covered 35 provinces through 52 partner installer crews and drew roughly 120,000 visits a month. |
The real turning point came in May 2023.
💰 Must Be Company — a joint venture between Thai billionaire Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi's ThaiBev and Frasers Property — subscribed THB 1.953 billion for 50% of BetterBe, NocNoc's operator. SCG kept the other half.
Suddenly, NocNoc wasn't just an SCG side project. It had 2 of Thailand's biggest conglomerates writing cheques.
🏔️ At its peak, NocNoc:
had 16.6 million users on the platform
hosted 900,000+ SKUs from 6,000 sellers by 2024
hit peak revenue of THB 412 million in 2023
crossed THB 5 billion in platform sales in its first 3 years
AI recommendations lifted conversion by up to 58%
expanded into Indonesia
became the largest remaining local e‑marketplace operator in Thailand
From the outside, this was a corporate marketplace story going exactly to plan.
📉 The Fall of NocNoc
But NocNoc had a quiet problem that no growth metric could fix.
NocNoc lost money every single year, and in 2023 (its record revenue year), it posted its highest-ever net loss, THB 1.25 billion.
That year NocNoc grew its revenue 2.5×. It grew its loss by 40%.
📌 Here’s what happened to NocNoc:
NocNoc has been committed and tried its very best to develop the platform, deliver sincere service and build better living for customers, partner shops, partners and every entrepreneur. But with the current economic conditions and extremely intense competition in the e-commerce market, the company has considered this very carefully and deeply regrets having to end the platform's services.
🚪 Knock knock, SCG's at the door

Feb 2019 — 🚀 NocNoc soft-launched as a one-stop home-and-living marketplace with a ~US$6 million build budget.
Jun 2019 — Operating in 35 provinces through 52 partner installer crews, with ~120,000 visits a month.
But first-year numbers already told the story: THB 5 million revenue vs THB 155 million loss.
31 May 2023 — 💰 Must Be Company (ThaiBev + Frasers Property) subscribed THB 1.953 billion for 50% of BetterBe, NocNoc's operator.
24 Oct 2023 — AWS case study revealed NocNoc had 16.6 million users and had more than doubled sales using machine learning.
25 Jan 2024 — 🎯 NocNoc set an ambitious THB 6.5 billion sales target for 2024, claiming 600,000+ products and 6,000 sellers.
NocNoc never published its 2024 sales. BetterBe's filings show its revenue fell 22% that year, to THB 322 million.
🚪🔒 Nobody's home anymore

8 Nov 2024 — ⚠️ Must Be quietly made available a THB 1.15 billion shareholder loan facility to BetterBe.
Frasers only disclosed it 13 months later, in a filing.
1 Jul 2025 — 🔁 NocNoc announced Anupong Tasaduak (ex-MD of Renos) would take over as CEO from founder Chonlak.
25 Dec 2025 — Frasers Property signed up to put up to THB 938.6 million more in through Must Be, and SCG was expected to add its share.
9 Jan 2026 — 📢 Just 2 weeks later, BetterBe told Thailand's e-commerce regulator (ETDA) it was shutting NocNoc.
SCG's filing called it a joint decision of the shareholders, and said SCG expected to book a ~THB 1.8 billion non-cash loss for it in Q4 2025.
9 Feb 2026 — 🛑 NocNoc stopped accepting new orders through all channels at 00:00.
8 Apr 2026 — Final deadline for pending deliveries; general after-sales ended at 18:00.
9 May 2026 — ⚰️ NocNoc ended all platform services at 23:59.
From 2020 to 2024, NocNoc lost THB 4.39 billion on THB 1.18 billion of revenue — about 3.7 baht lost for every baht it brought in.
NocNoc built real scale, real users, real tech. But heavy-goods vertical e-commerce is a brutally expensive game — bulky logistics, low purchase frequency, high coordination costs. And as e-commerce expert Pawoot Pongvitayapanu told the Bangkok Post, NocNoc's reliance on subsidised pricing proved unsustainable.
NocNoc's owners didn't run out of money. As Priceza's CEO Thanawat Malabuppha told the Bangkok Post: "Its closure reflects how shareholders were unwilling to continue absorbing losses over the past few years, despite having strong cash reserves."
Want to learn more about NocNoc’s downfall?
⚠️ 2 Mistakes
Mistake 1: Running a full-stack service business on marketplace commissions
NocNoc took on the hardest parts of home renovation — a network of partner installer crews (52 across 35 provinces by June 2019), contractor coordination, installation warranties, physical sample delivery.
Then it monetised all of that with a sales fee of 5.35–10.70% depending on category (plus a 2.14% payment fee).
🤦🏻♂️ By taking a marketplace-style take rate while doing contractor-grade work, NocNoc was essentially subsidising its own sellers.
The math was ugly from day one:
2023 selling and service expenses: THB 1.555 billion
2023 revenue: THB 412 million
NocNoc spent nearly 4 baht on selling and service for every 1 baht of revenue
No volume of users or SKUs could bend a curve this steep.
Mistake 2: Treating corporate capital like VC capital
Here's the non-obvious one.
NocNoc was never founder-independent, and no report or filing shows a venture round. From day one, its backers were SCG, later joined by ThaiBev and Frasers Property — all corporate parents answerable to their own shareholders.
🚨 Shopee and Lazada each ran for more than 10 years before turning a profit.
A local rival needs backers who can wait that long. Pawoot told the same paper that shareholders of SET-listed firms are reluctant to absorb losses and focus on short-term profit.
On 25 Dec 2025 Frasers signed up to put up to THB 938.6 million more in. Just 2 weeks later the shareholders decided to shut NocNoc down, and SCG's investor deck filed it under "Recent Restructurings/Streamlining".
The underlying mismatch → corporate backing ≠ patient capital.
🧠 3 Lessons Learned
Lesson 1: Price for the work you actually do
NocNoc charged a 5.35–10.70% sales fee plus a 2.14% payment fee while coordinating partner installer crews (52 across 35 provinces by June 2019), delivering heavy goods, and honouring installation warranties.
Marketplace-grade pricing can never fund contractor-grade operations.
🌮 Key Takeaways:
Your take rate must cover the real cost of what you deliver, not the benchmark of the category you want to be compared with.
If gross margin cannot cover coordination costs, scaling turns a small per-order loss into a bigger per-order loss.
🛠️ Operator Playbook:
🧮 Run a per-order P&L on your top 100 orders
Columns: revenue, commission, delivery, installer/service, support, warranty reserve.
If contribution per order is negative, you have a pricing problem — not a scale problem.
📊 Benchmark against who actually does your job
Compare your take rate with what a full-service contractor charges for the same job, not with horizontal marketplaces.
List the costs that contractor's price already covers — shipping, installation, warranty — and check which of them your fee actually pays for.
If one fee can't carry the service, add a second revenue line — installation fee, service plan, premium tier.
Lesson 2: Your investors' patience sets your runway
NocNoc's backers were listed companies — Siam Cement Group (SCG), Thai Beverage (ThaiBev) and Frasers Property.
Each answerable to public shareholders. SCG filed the closure under its 2025 restructuring, alongside a plan for "exiting underperforming businesses".
NocNoc's owners still had strong cash reserves, Priceza's CEO told the Bangkok Post; what they lacked was the willingness to keep absorbing losses.
🌮 Key Takeaways:
Quarterly profit cycles compound into founder deadlines, even when the balance sheet looks limitless.
Decade-long bets need decade-long investors. Anything shorter is a hidden deadline on your cap table.
🛠️ Operator Playbook:
🗺️ Build a cap-table patience matrix before you raise
For each investor, map 3 columns: fund life remaining (or parent-co profit-reporting cycle), public-market reporting frequency, and reserved follow-on capacity.
Compare each row against your projected years-to-breakeven; flag any gap >3 years as a signalling risk and either renegotiate reserves or line up a bridge investor with a longer horizon.
Shopee and Lazada each ran 10+ years before turning a profit. Ask whether your backers could fund that wait.
Lesson 3: Fresh capital doesn't fix broken unit economics
📉 By 2022, NocNoc already had its warning: revenue slipped from THB 200M to THB 165M while losses grew from THB 670M to THB 891M.
After the May 2023 deal, NocNoc went wider, and by 2024 it listed 900K SKUs (up from 500K) from 6,000 sellers (up from 3,000). It then set a 2024 sales target of THB 6.5 billion, up 40% — and saw its own revenue fall 22% that year.
🌮 Key Takeaways:
Set next year's target on contribution per order, not sales. Because you can still hit a sales target while losing more on every order.
🛠️ Operator Playbook:
🩺 Diagnose the signal before deploying fresh capital
If losses grew faster than revenue last year, that is a model signal, not a scale signal.
Ask: "What specifically changes about per-unit economics if we spend this on scope versus iteration?"
If the answer is "nothing", you are funding expansion into a leak.
🧪 Pilot new categories as revenue tests, not expansion bets
Launch 1 new category at <5% of GMV before adding more.
Measure contribution margin, repeat rate, support cost, return rate — against the existing core.
Only roll out when the pilot beats the core on at least 2 of those 4 metrics.
🔗 The Runway Insights
Will agents have network effects? (Read)
The AI monetisation debate shifts again (Read)
Prediction: the next massive Google update is around the corner (Read)
$20M from Accel & Index to replace Slack — with no co-founder (Read)
We're building multiplayer AI. Here's what we've learned so far (Read)
Harvey vs Legora: when are terrible gross margins OK? (Read)
💰 Southeast Asia Funding Radar
Manus raises $500M+ after China blocked Meta's $2B deal (More)
OneByZero secures $20M (Series A) to expand AI-driven data and analytics solutions across enterprise clients regionally (More)
Boost, Axiata's Malaysian fintech arm, gets $20M in equity from IFC at a $340M valuation to grow its digital lending business (More)
3cat bags $4M (Series A) to expand its pre-owned electronics marketplace from Malaysia into the Philippines (More)
Zeya Health acquires ConnectLah to build AI infrastructure for healthcare clinics across the Southeast Asia region (More)
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That’s all for today
Thanks for reading. I hope you enjoyed today's issue. More than that, I hope you’ve learned some actionable tips to build and grow your business.
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See you again next week.
- Admond
Disclaimer: The Runway Ventures content is for informational purposes only. Unless otherwise stated, any opinions expressed above belong solely to the author.





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